外文文献原文
The Diffusion of Equity Incentive Plans in Italian Listed Companies
1.INTRODUCTION
Past studies have brought to light the dissimilarities in the pay packages of managers in Anglo-Saxon countries as compared with other nations (e.g., Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002; Cheffins and Thomas, 2004; Zattoni, 2007). In the UK and, above all in the US, remuneration encompasses a variety of components, and short and long term variable pay carries more weight than elsewhere (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). In other countries, however, fixed wages have always been the main ingredient in top managers’ pay schemes. Over time, variable short-term pay has become more substantial and the impact of fringe benefits has gradually grown. Notwithstanding, incentives linked to reaching medium to long-term company goals have never been widely used (Towers Perrin, 2000).
In recent years, however, pay packages of managers have undergone an appreciable change as variable pay has increased considerably, even outside the US and the UK. In particular, managers in most countries have experienced an increase in the variable pay related to long-term goals. Within the context of this general trend toward medium and long-term incentives, there is a pronounced tendency to adopt plans involving stocks or stock options (Towers Perrin, 2000; 2005). The drivers of the diffusion of long term incentive plans seem to be some recent changes in the institutional and market environment at the local and global
levels. Particularly important triggers of the convergence toward the US pay paradigm are both market oriented drivers, such as the evolving share ownership patterns or the internationalization of the labor market, and law-oriented drivers, such as corporate or tax regulation (Cheffins and Thomas, 2004). Driven by these changes in the institutional and market environment, we observe a global trend toward the “Americanization of international pay practices,” characterized by high incentives and very lucrative compensation mechanisms (e.g., Cheffins, 2003; Cheffins and Thomas, 2004).
Ironically, the spread of the US pay paradigm around the world happens when it is hotly debated at home. In particular, the critics are concerned with both the level of executive compensation packages and the use of equity incentive plans (Cheffins and Thomas, 2004). Critics stressed that US top managers, and particularly the CEOs, receive very lucrative compensation packages. The ’80s and ’90s saw an increasing disparity between CEO’s pay and that of rank-and-file workers. Thanks to this effect, their direct compensation has become a hundred times that of an average employee (Hall and Liebman, 1998). The main determinants of the increasing level of CEOs’ and executives’ compensation are annual bonuses and, above all, stock option grants (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). Stock option plans have recently been criticized by scholars and public opinion because they characteristically are too generous and symptomatic of a managerial extraction of the firm’s value (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2006).
In light of these recent events and of the increased tendency to adopt equity incentive plans, this paper aims at understanding the reasons behind the
dissemination of stock option and stock granting plans outside the US and the UK. The choice to investigate this phenomenon in Italy relies on the following arguments. First, the large majority of previous studies analyze the evolution of executive compensation and equity incentive plans in the US and, to a smaller extent, in the UK. Second, ownership structure and governance practices in continental European countries are substantially different from the ones in Anglo-Saxon countries. Third, continental European countries, and Italy in particular, almost ignored the use of these instruments until the end of the ’90s.
Our goal is to compare the explanatory power of three competing views on the diffusion of equity incentive plans: 1) the optimal contracting view, which states that compensation packages are designed to minimize agency costs between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990); 2) the rent extraction view, which states that powerful insiders may influence the pay process for their own benefit (Bebchuk et al., 2002); and 3) the perceived-cost view (Hall and Murphy, 2003), which states that companies may favor some compensation schemes for their (supposed or real)cost advantages.
To this purpose, we conducted an empirical study on the reasons why Italian listed companies adopted equity incentive plans since the end of the ’90s. To gain a deep understanding of the phenomenon, we collected data and information both on the evolution of the national institutional environment in the last decade and on the diffusion and the characteristics (i.e., technical aspects and objectives) of equity incentive plans adopted by Italian listed companies in 1999 and 2005. We used both logit models and difference-of-means statistical
techniques to analyze data. Our results show that: 1) firm size, and not its ownership structure, is a determinant of the adoption of these instruments; 2) these plans are not extensively used to extract company value, although a few cases suggest this possibility; and 3) plans’ characteristics are consistent with the ones defined by tax law to receive special fiscal treatment.
Our findings contribute to the development of the literature on both the rationales behind the spreading of equity incentive schemes and the diffusion of new governance practices. They show, in fact, that equity incentive plans have been primarily adopted to take advantage of large tax benefits, and that in some occasions they may have been used by controlling shareholders to extract company value at the expense of minority shareholders. In other words, our findings suggest that Italian listed companies adopted equity incentive plans to perform a subtle form of decoupling. On the one hand, they declared that plans were aimed to align shareholders’ and managers’ interests and incentive value creation. On the other hand, thanks to the lack of transparency and previous knowledge about these instruments, companies used these mechanisms to take advantage of tax benefits and sometimes also to distribute a large amount of value to some powerful individuals. These results support a symbolic perspective on corporate governance, according to which the introduction of equity incentive plans please stakeholders – for their implicit alignment of interests and incentive to value creation – without implying a substantive improvement of governance practices.
2.Corporate Governance in Italian Listed Companies
Italian companies are traditionally controlled by a large blockholder (Zattoni, 1999). Banks and other financial institutions do not own large shareholdings and do not exert a significant influence on governance of large companies, at least as far as they are able to repay their financial debt (Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques, 2001). Institutional investors usually play a marginal role because of their limited shareholding, their strict connections with Italian banks, and a regulatory environment that does not offer incentives for their activism. Finally, the stock market is relatively small and undeveloped, and the market for corporate control is almost absent (Bianco, 2001). In short, the Italian governance system can be described as a system of “weak managers, strong blockholders, and unprotected minority shareholders” (Melis, 2000: 354).
The board of directors is traditionally one tier, but a shareholders’ general meeting must appoint also a board of statutory auditors as well whose main task is to monitor the directors’ performance (Melis, 2000). Further, some studies published in the ’90s showed that the board of directors was under the relevant influence of large blockholders. Both inside and outside directors were in fact related to controlling shareholders by family or business ties (Melis, 1999;2000; Molteni, 1997).
Consistent with this picture, fixed wages have been the main ingredient of top managers’ remuneration, and incentive schemes linked to reaching medium to long term company goals have never been widely used (Melis, 1999). Equity incentive schemes adopted by Italian companies issue stocks to all employees unconditionally for the purpose of improving the company atmosphere and
stabilizing the share value on the Stock Exchange. Only very few can be compared with stock option plans in the true sense of the term. Even in this case, however, directors and top managers were rarely evaluated through stock returns, because of the supposed limited ability of the Italian stock market to measure firm’s performance (Melis, 1999).
3.The Evolution of Italian Institutional Context
The institutional context in Italy has evolved radically in the last decade, creating the possibility for the dissemination of equity incentive plans. The main changes regarded the development of commercial law, the introduction and updating of the code of good governance, the issue of some reports encouraging the use of equity incentive plans, and the evolution of the tax law (Zattoni, 2006).
Concerning the national law and regulations, some reforms in the commercial law (1998, 2003, and 2005) and the introduction (1999) and update (2002) of the national code of good governance contributed to the improvement of the corporate governance of listed companies (Zattoni, 2006). Financial markets and corporate law reforms improved the efficiency of the Stock Exchange and created an institutional environment more favorable to institutional investors’ activism (Bianchi and Enriques, 2005). At the same time the introduction and update of the code of good governance contributed to the improvement of governance practices at the board level. These reforms did not produce an immediate effect on governance practices of Italian listed companies, although they contributed to improve, slowly and with some delay, their governance standards (Zattoni, 2006).
Beyond the evolution of governance practices, some changes in the institutional environment directly affected the diffusion and the characteristics of equity incentive plans. Both the white paper of the Ministry of the Industry and Foreign Commerce and the code of good governance issued by the national Stock Exchange invited companies to implement equity incentive plans in order to develop a value creation culture in Italian companies. Furthermore, in 1997 fiscal regulations were enacted allowing a tax exemption on the shares received through an equity incentive plan. According to the new regulation, which took effect on January 1, 1998, issuance of new stocks to employees by an employer or another company belonging to the same group did not represent compensation in kind for income tax purposes (Autuori 2001). In the following years, the evolution of tax rules reduced the generous benefits associated with the use of equity incentive plans, but also the new rules continued to favor the dissemination of these plans.
Driven by these changes in the institutional context, equity incentive plans became widely diffused among Italian listed companies at the end of the ’90s (Zattoni, 2006). Ironically, the diffusion of these instruments – in Italy and in other countries, such as Germany (Bernhardt, 1999), Spain (Alvarez Perez and Neira Fontela, 2005), and Japan (Nagaoka, 2005) – took place when they were strongly debated in the US for their unpredicted consequences and the malpractices associated with their use (Bebchuk et al., 2002).
4.The Rationales Explaining the Adoption of Equity Incentive Plans
Equity incentive plans are a main component of executive compensation in the
US. Their use is mostly founded on the argument that they give managers an incentive to act in the shareholders’ interests by providing a direct link between their compensation and firm stock-price performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Beyond that, equity incentive plans also have other positive features, as they may contribute to the attraction and retention of highly motivated employees, encourage beneficiaries to take risks, and reduce direct cash expenses for executive compensation (Hall and Murphy, 2003).
Despite all their positive features, the use of equity incentive plans is increasingly debated in the US. In particular, critics question their presumed effectiveness in guaranteeing the alignment of executives’ and shareholders’ interests. They point out that these instruments may be adopted to fulfill other objectives, such as to extract value at shareholders expenses (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2006), or even to achieve a (real or perceived) reduction in compensation costs (e.g., Murphy, 2002). In summary, the actual debate indicates that three different rationales may explain the dissemination and the specific features of equity incentive plans:1) the optimal contracting view (Jensen and Murphy,1990 );2) the rent extraction view (Bebchuk et al., 2002); and 3)the perceived-cost view (Hall and Murphy, 2003).
According to the optimal contracting view, executive compensation packages are designed to minimize agency costs between top managers (agents) and shareholders (principals) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The boards of directors are effective governance mechanisms aimed at maximizing shareholder value and the top management’s compensation scheme is designed to serve this objective
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Providing managers with equity incentive plans may mitigate managerial self-interest by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Following the alignment rationale, equity incentives may improve firm performance, as managers are supposed to work for their own and shareholders’ benefit (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). In short, these instruments are designed to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, and to motivate the former to pursue the creation of share value (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
4.1 the principle of equity incentive
Managers and shareholders is a delegate agency relationship managers operating in assets under management, shareholders entrusted. But in fact, in the agency relationship, the contract between the asymmetric information, shareholders and managers are not completely dependent on the manager's moral self-discipline. The pursuit of the goals of shareholders and managers is inconsistent. Shareholders want to maximize the equity value of its holdings of managers who want to maximize their own utility, so the \"moral hazard\" exists between the shareholders and managers, through incentive and restraint mechanisms to guide and limit the behavior of managers.
In a different way of incentives, wages based on the manager's qualification conditions and company, the target performance of a predetermined relatively stable in a certain period of time, a very close relationship with the company's target performance. Bonuses generally super-goal performance assessment to
determine the part of the revenue manager performance is closely related with the company's short-term performance, but with the company's long-term value of the relationship is not obvious, the manager for short-term financial indicators at the expense of the company long-term interests. But from the point of view of shareholders' investment, he was more concerned with long-term increase in the value of the company. Especially for growth-oriented companies, the value of the manager's more to reflect the increase in the company's long-term value, rather than just short-term financial indicators.
In order to make the managers are concerned about the interests of shareholders need to make the pursuit of the interests of managers and shareholders as consistent as possible. In this regard, the equity incentive is a better solution. By making the manager holds an equity interest in a certain period of time, to enjoy the value-added benefits of equity risk in a certain way, and to a certain extent, you can make managers more concerned about the long-term value of the company in the business process. Equity incentive incentive and restraint to prevent short-term behavior of the manager, to guide its long-term behavior.
4.2 Equity Incentive mode
(1) The performance of stock
Refers to a more reasonable performance targets at the beginning of the year, if the incentive object to the end to achieve the desired goal, the company granted
a certain number of shares or to extract a reward fund to buy company stock. The flow of performance shares realized that usually have the time and number restrictions. Another performance of the stock in the operation and role relative to similar long-term incentive performance units and performance stock difference is that the performance shares granted stock, performance units granted cash.
(2) stock options
Refers to a company the right to grant incentive target incentive object can purchase a certain amount of the outstanding shares of the Company at a predetermined price within a specified period may be waived this right. The exercise of stock options have the time and limit the number of cash and the need to motivate the objects on their own expenditure for the exercise. Some of our listed companies in the application of virtual stock options are a combination of phantom stock and stock options, the Company granted incentive object is a virtual stock options, incentive objects rights, phantom stock.
(3) virtual stock
That the company awarded the incentive target a virtual stock incentive objects which enjoy a certain amount of the right to dividends and stock appreciation gains, but not ownership, without voting rights, can not be transferred and sold, expire automatically when you leave the enterprise.
(4) stock appreciation rights
Means the incentive target of a right granted to the company's share price rose, the incentive object can be obtained through the exercise with the corresponding number of stock appreciation gains, the incentive objects do not have to pay cash for the exercise, exercise, get cash or the equivalent in shares of companies .
(5) restricted stock
Refers to the prior grant incentive target a certain number of company shares, but the source of the stock, selling, etc. There are some special restrictions, generally only when the incentive object to accomplish a specific goal (eg, profitability), the incentive target in order to sell restricted stock and benefit from it.
(6) The deferred payment
Refers to a package of salary income plan designed to motivate object, which part of the equity incentive income, equity incentive income was issued, but according to the fair market value of the company's shares to be converted into the number of shares after a certain period of time, the form of company stock or when the stock market value in cash paid to the incentive target.
(7) the operator / employee-owned
Means the incentive target to hold a certain number of the company's stock,
the stock is a free gift incentive target, or object of company subsidy incentives to buy, or incentive target is self-financed the purchase. Incentive objects can benefit from appreciation in the stock losses in the devaluation of the stock.
(8)Management / employee acquisition
Means to leverage financing to the company's management or all employees to purchase shares of the Company, to become shareholders of the Company and other shareholders of risk and profit sharing, to change the company's ownership structure, control over the structure and asset structure, to achieve ownership business.
(9) The book value appreciation rights
Divided into specific buy and virtual two. Purchase type refers to the incentive target in the beginning of the period per share net asset value of the actual purchase of a certain number of shares, end of period value of the net assets per share at the end of the period and then sold back to the company. Virtual type incentive target in the beginning of the period without expenditure of funds granted by the Company on behalf of the incentive target a certain number of shares calculated at the end of the period, according to the increment of the net assets per share and the number of shares in the name of the proceeds to stimulate the object, and accordingly to incentive target payment in cash.
外文文献译文
股权激励计划在意大利上市公司扩散
1.引言
过去的研究揭示了管理者薪酬在盎格鲁撒克逊国家和其他国家相比的差异（例如，贝舒克，弗莱德和瓦尔克，2002；柴芬斯和托马斯，2004；萨特尼，2007）。在英国，尤其是美国，报酬包括各种部分，和其他地方薪酬相比，短期和长期的可变报酬占了主要部分（康勇和墨菲，2002）。然而在其他国家，固定工资在高级管理者的薪酬计划中占了主要部分。随着时间的推移，可变短期报酬已经变得更为重要，附加福利的影响已经逐渐增加。尽管如此，与达到中期到长期的公司目标挂钩的激励机制从来没有被广泛应用。
然而，最近几年，管理者的全部报酬已经经历了一个相当可观的改变，可变报酬已经合理增加，这包括了除美国和英国以外的国家。尤其是，大多数国家的的管理者已经经历了与长期目标相关的可变报酬的增加。在趋向中期和长期激励的大的背景下，出现了一个显著的趋势—采用与股票或股权期权相关的计划(韬睿派林，2000；2005)。在当地和国际水平下，长期激励计划传播的推动者在体制和市场环境中看起来最近有些变化。特别重要是对美国的报酬范例趋同触发器都以市场为导向的驱动，例如股权形式的演化或劳动力市场的国际化，法律驱动，例如法人或税收规则（柴芬斯和托马斯，2004）。在体制和市场环境中，由于这些变化的推动，我们观察到了一个趋向于“国际报酬行为美国化”的全球趋势，以高奖励和非常丰厚的报酬机制为特点（例如，柴芬斯，2003；柴芬斯和托马斯，2004）。
讽刺的是，美国报酬范例在本国激烈争论时，就在世界范围发生扩散了。特别是，评论家关注管理层薪资水平和股权激励计划的应用（柴芬斯和托马斯，2004）。评论家强调美国高层管理者，特别是首席执行官，都获得非常丰厚的报酬。八九十年代出现了首席执
行官和基层员工之间报酬的日益悬殊。由于这种效应，他们的直接报酬已经是平均雇佣者的一百倍（霍尔和李普曼，1988）。首席执行官和管理者薪资的增长水平的决定性因素是年终分红，尤其是股权认证奖金（康勇和墨菲，2000）。股票期权计划最近已经受到学者和公众批评，因为他们太慷慨，典型的一个公司价值管理的提取症状（贝舒克等, 2002；贝舒克和弗莱德，2006）。
根据最近这些事件和采用股权激励计划增长倾向，这篇文章主要在于理解除美国和英国之外，股票期权和股票授予计划宣传背后的原因。选择在意大利调查这种现象依靠以下观点。首先，以前的大部分研究分析管理层薪资和股权激励计划在美国和英国的发展。其次，所有权结构和管理措施在欧洲大陆国家与盎格鲁撒克逊国家有本质区别。最后，欧洲大陆国家，尤其是意大利，几乎都忽视这些结构的使用，直到九十年代末。
我们的目标是对比这三个相互矛盾观点在股权激励计划扩散上的解释力：1）最佳承包观点，阐述了薪资报酬的目的是把管理者和股东之间的代理成本最小化（詹森和墨菲，1990）；2）阐述了强大的内部人员可能为他们自己的利益而影响报酬过程（贝舒克等, 2002）；3）认知成本观点（霍尔和墨菲，2003），阐述了公司可能会为了他们的（假定或实际）成本优势而赞成一些报酬机制。
为什么意大利上市公司在九十年代末采用股权激励计划，为了这个目的，我们进行了实证研究寻找原因。为获得这个现象的深层理解，我们收集了最近十年在国家体制环境演变下的数据信息和在1999年和2005年意大利上市公司采用股权激励计划的扩散和特点（即，技术方面和目标）。我们使用逻辑模型和不同方式的统计技术分析数据。我们的结果显示：1）公司规模，而不是所有权结构，是采用这些模式的一个决定性因素；2） 这些计划没有被广泛应用，提取公司价值，尽管一些案例显示了这个可能性；3） 计划的特点与税收法定义的一致，接受特殊财政处理。
我们的调查结果有助于发展股权激励计划传播和新兴管理措施传播的原理。实际上，结果显示股权奖励计划已经被首先采用，以把握大量税收利益，在一些情况下它们可能已经被用来控制股东以牺牲小股东为代价来提取公司价值。换句话说，我们的调查结果显示了意大利上市公司采用股权激励计划以实行一个微妙的分离模式。一方面，他们宣布这些计划主要在于定位股东和管理者的利益和激励价值的创造。另一方面，由于缺乏透明度和关于这些结构的前期知识，公司采用这些机制，利用税收利益，有时也分配一大部分价值给一些强有力的个体。这些结果支持一个公司管理的象征性认知，根据这项认知，股权激励计划的简介，请股东为了他们隐含的利益和激励定位，评定价值创造，这并不意味管理措施的实质改善。
2.意大利上市公司的公司管理
意大利公司传统上由一个大股东控制（萨特尼，1999）。银行和其他金融机构不拥有大部分股权，在大型公司的管理上也没有发挥强有力的影响，至少直到他们能够偿还金融贷款（比安奇，比安科和恩里克，2001）。体制投资者通常起着边缘作用，因为他们拥有有限的股权，他们和意大利银行有着严密联系，并且没有为他们积极性的激励提供监管环境。最后，股市相对较小并且没有发展，公司控制市场几乎缺失（比安科，2001）。总之，意大利管理系统能被描述为一个“无力管理者，强大股东和无能力保护小股东”的系统（梅里斯，2000）。
董事会传统上是一层，但是股东全体大会必须委任一个法定的审计委员会， 他们的主要任务是监督董事的行为（梅里斯，2000）。进一步来说，在九十年代发布的一些研究显示董事会受大股东的相关影响。实际上内、外董事都通过家族或业务关系控制股东（梅里斯，1999；2000；蒙太尼，1997）。
与此图片一致，固定工资已经成为高级管理者薪酬的主要成分，而与达到中期到长期公司目标挂钩的激励计划从来没有被广泛应用（梅里斯，1999）。意大利公司采用的股权奖励机制无条件地发行股票给全体员工，以改善公司氛围和稳定股票交易市场上的股价。实质上没有什么能与股权激励计划相比较。然而，即使在这种情况下，董事和高层管理者很少通过股份返利进行估价，因为假定意大利股市在衡量公司效益的能力有限（梅里斯，1999）。
3.意大利体制框架的演变
意大利的体制框架在过去十年已经有了根本改变，产生了股权激励计划传播的可能性。关于商业法发展的主要改变，良好治理法典的简介和更新，一些鼓励股权激励计划实行的报告和税法演变的发行。
关于国家法律和法规，商业法（1998，2003和2005）和良好治理法典的简介（1999）和更新（2002）的一些改革有助于上市公司管理的提高。（萨特尼, 2006）金融市场和公司法律改革提高了股票交易市场的效率，创造了一个对体制积极投资者更有利的体制环境（比安奇和恩里克，2005）。同时良好治理法典的简介和更新有助于董事阶层管理行为的提高。这些改革在意大利上市公司的管理应用上没有产生及时效应，尽管他们慢慢地而且推迟，但有助于提高管理标准（萨特尼， 2006）。
超越管理实践的演变，体制环境的一些改变直接影响股权激励计划的传播和特征。国家股票交易所签署，工业和对外贸易部门发布的白皮书和良好治理法典引导公司执行股权激励机制，为意大利公司发展价值创造文化。此外，在1997年，财政法规制定，允许通过股权奖励机制对股份税收的豁免。根据1998年1月实行的新法规，由雇佣者或者属于同一集团的另一个公司对被雇佣者的发行新股票并不代表实物收入税的补偿（奥沃瑞,
2001）。在接下来的几年，税收法演变减少了与股权激励机制相关的大部分利益，但是新规定也有助于这些机制的传播。
受体制结构变化驱动，在九十年代末股权激励机制在意大利上市公司中广泛应用（萨特尼，2006）。讽刺的是，当这些机制在美国由于不可预测的结果和关于他们使用的不当交易有强烈争议时，就在意大利和其他国家扩散，例如德国，西班牙和日本。
4.股权激励计划采用的原理阐述
在美国股权激励计划是管理层薪资报酬的一个主要部分。股权激励计划的使用主要基于下面的争论：他们激励管理者通过提供报酬和公司股价之间的直接链接在股东利益中扮演角色（詹森和墨菲，1990）。在这之上，股权激励计划也有其他的积极特征，为他们有助于吸引和留住高积极性的员工，鼓励受益者冒险，减少管理者薪资报酬的直接现金开支（霍尔和墨菲，2003）。
尽管股权激励计划有所有这些积极特征，股权激励计划的使用在美国争论越来越大。尤其是，评论者对他们在保证管理者和股东利益对准的假定效率提出疑问。他们指出，这些因素可能被用来满足其他的目标，例如在股东开支上提取价值（例如，贝舒克和佛莱德，2006），甚至达到实际或认知的报酬费用的削减（例如，墨菲，2002）。总之，实际争论说明三个不同的原理可以解释股权激励计划的传播和特有特征：1）最优合约观点（詹森和墨菲，1990）；2）抽租观点（贝舒克等，2002）；3）认知成本观点（霍尔和墨菲，2003）。
根据最优合约观点，管理者薪资报酬方案目的在于最小化高层管理者（代理人）和股东（负责人）之间的代理成本（詹森和墨菲，1976）。董事会是有效的管理机制，目的在于最大化股东价值，高层管理者报酬机制目的在于服务于这个目标（法玛和詹森，1983）。
通过调整管理者和股东的利益，提供管理者股权激励计划会减轻管理私利（詹森和麦考林，1976）。随之的调整原理，股权激励会提高公司绩效，因为管理者应该为他们自己和股东的利益工作（詹森和墨菲， 1990）。 简言之，这些措施的目的都在于调整管理者和股东的利益，激励管理者追求股份价值创造（詹森和墨菲，1990）。
4.1股权激励的原理
经理人和股东实际上是一个委托代理的关系，股东委托经理人经营管理资产。但事实上，在委托代理关系中，由于信息不对称，股东和经理人之间的契约并不完全，需要依赖经理人的“道德自律”。股东和经理人追求的目标是不一致的，股东希望其持有的股权价值最大化，经理人则希望自身效用最大化，因此股东和经理人之间存在“道德风险”，需要通过激励和约束机制来引导和限制经理人行为。
在不同的激励方式中，工资主要根据经理人的资历条件和公司情况、目标业绩预先确定，在一定时期内相对稳定，与公司的目标业绩的关系非常密切。奖金一般以超目标业绩的考核来确定经理人该部分的收入，因此与公司的短期业绩表现关系密切，但与公司的长期价值关系不明显，经理人有可能为了短期的财务指标而牺牲公司的长期利益。但是从股东投资角度来说，他更多关心的是公司长期价值的增加。尤其是对于成长型的公司来说，经理人的价值更多地体现在公司长期价值的增加，而不仅仅是短期财务指标的实现。
为了使经理人关心股东利益，需要使经理人和股东的利益追求尽可能趋于一致。对此，股权激励是一个较好的解决方案。通过使经理人在一定时期内持有股权，享受股权的增值收益，并在一定程度上以一定方式承担风险，可以使经理人在经营过程中更多地关心公司的长期价值。股权激励对防止经理的短期行为，引导其长期行为具有较好的激励和约束作用。
4.2股权激励的模式
（1）业绩股票
是指在年初确定一个较为合理的业绩目标，如果激励对象到年末时达到预定的目标，则公司授予其一定数量的股票或提取一定的奖励基金购买公司股票。业绩股票的流通变现通常有时间和数量限制。另一种与业绩股票在操作和作用上相类似的长期激励方式是业绩单位，它和业绩股票的区别在于业绩股票是授予股票，而业绩单位是授予现金。
（2）股票期权
是指公司授予激励对象的一种权利，激励对象可以在规定的时期内以事先确定的价格购买一定数量的本公司流通股票，也可以放弃这种权利。股票期权的行权也有时间和数量限制，且需激励对象自行为行权支出现金。目前在我国有些上市公司中应用的虚拟股票期权是虚拟股票和股票期权的结合，即公司授予激励对象的是一种虚拟的股票认购权，激励对象行权后获得的是虚拟股票。
（3）虚拟股票
是指公司授予激励对象一种虚拟的股票，激励对象可以据此享受一定数量的分红权和股价升值收益，但没有所有权，没有表决权，不能转让和出售，在离开企业时自动失效。
（4）股票增值权
是指公司授予激励对象的一种权利，如果公司股价上升，激励对象可通过行权获得相应数量的股价升值收益，激励对象不用为行权付出现金，行权后获得现金或等值的公司股
票。
（5）限制性股票
是指事先授予激励对象一定数量的公司股票，但对股票的来源、抛售等有一些特殊限制，一般只有当激励对象完成特定目标（如扭亏为盈）后，激励对象才可抛售限制性股票并从中获益。
（6）延期支付
是指公司为激励对象设计一揽子薪酬收入计划，其中有一部分属于股权激励收入，股权激励收入不在当年发放，而是按公司股票公平市价折算成股票数量，在一定期限后，以公司股票形式或根据届时股票市值以现金方式支付给激励对象。
（7）经营者/员工持股
是指让激励对象持有一定数量的本公司的股票，这些股票是公司无偿赠与激励对象的、或者是公司补贴激励对象购买的、或者是激励对象自行出资购买的。激励对象在股票升值时可以受益，在股票贬值时受到损失。
（8）管理层/员工收购
是指公司管理层或全体员工利用杠杆融资购买本公司的股份，成为公司股东，与其他股东风险共担、利益共享，从而改变公司的股权结构、控制权结构和资产结构，实现持股经营。
（9）帐面价值增值权
具体分为购买型和虚拟型两种。购买型是指激励对象在期初按每股净资产值实际购买一定数量的公司股份，在期末再按每股净资产期末值回售给公司。虚拟型是指激励对象在期初不需支出资金，公司授予激励对象一定数量的名义股份，在期末根据公司每股净资产的增量和名义股份的数量来计算激励对象的收益，并据此向激励对象支付现金。
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